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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Railroads-Misuse of Right of Way
Land acquired for a railroad right of way, whether by condemnation,
prescription, statutory presumption,' or by grant for railroad purposes
from the owner of the fee, 2 gives to the railroad only an easement in
such land.3  Unless there is an express grant of a fee title,4 the right of
way can be used for railroad purposes and no others. The same prin-
ciple is applicable to all public or quasi-public corporations which have
the power of eminent domain, i.e., the land can be used only for the
purposes for which it was taken. 5 The reasons for such a limitation are
twofold: (1) The right to acquire land by condemnation is based on
the presumption that the property so acquired will be used for the benefit
of the public. (2) A use for other purposes imposes an additional
burden upon the land for which the owner has not been compensated.
A railroad is not entitled to the exclusive use of the entire right of way,
and the owner of the fee is permitted to use so much of it as is not
actually required for railroad purposes.0 But the railroad may later
secure an injunction to have any obstruction removed when it is shown
that the use interferes with the operation of the railroad. 7
1 Several states have statutes which provide that if an action to recover com-
pensation for land taken for a railroad right of way is not brought within a fixed
period, the railroad is presumed to have acquired the land for railroad purposes.
N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-51 (1943) provides that no action for compensation for land
taken for a right of way by a railroad shall be brought unless commenced within
five years after the land has been entered, or within two years after the railroad
has started operations.
'For aid in distinguishing whether a deed to the railroad conveys a fee or
an easement, see Note, 132 A. L. R. 142 (1941).
'Grand Trunk R.R. v. Richardson, 91 U. S. 454 (1875); Norfolk So. R.R. v.
Strickland, 264 Fed. 546 (E. D. N. C. 1920); Hodges v. A. C. L. R.R., 196
N. C. 66, 144 S. E. 528 (1928); McCullock v. N. C. R.R., 146 N. C. 316, 59 S. E.
882 (1907); Seaboard A. L. Ry. v. Olive, 142 N. C. 257, 55 S. E. 263 (1906) ;
Raleigh and Augusta R.R. v. Sturgeon, 120 N. C. 225, 26 S. E. 797 (1896).
TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §1253 (3d ed. 1939). See Notes, 94 A. L. R. 525
(1935); 149 A. L. R. 380 (1944).
'Both the statutes of the state and the charter of the railroad company must
be examined to ascertain if the company has power to acquire a fee title to land.
N. C. GEN. STAT. §60-37(3) (1943) provides that railroads may acquire land by
voluntary grant, but land so acquired may be used only for railroad purposes.
N. C. GEN. STAT. §60-37(4) (1943) allows railroads to acquire necessary land by
purchase with no qualifications as to use.
'This is the general rule unless there is a statute explicitly authorizing the
taking of the fee by condemnation. Hudson & M. R.R. v. Wendel, 193 N. Y.
166, 85 N. E. 1023 (1908) ; Neitzel v. Spokane International R.R., 65 Wash. 100,
117 Pac. 864 (1911). 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §1253 (3d ed. 1939); 2 LEwIs,
EMINENT DOMAIN §§449-451 (1900).
' Carolina & N. W. R.R. v. Piedmont Wagon and Mfg. Co., 229 N. C. 695,
51 S. E. 2d 301 (1949) ; A. C. L. R.R. v. Bunting, 168 N. C. 579, 84 S. E. 1009
(1915) ; Raleigh and Augusta R.R. v. Olive, 142 N. C. 257, 55 S. E. 263 (1906);
Shields v. Norfolk and Carolina R.R., 129 N. C. 1, 39 S. E. 582 (1901).
'Norfolk So. R.R. v. Strickland, 264 Fed. 546 (E. D. N. C. 1920); Carolina
& N. W. R.R. v. Piedmont Wagon and Mfg. Co., 229 N. C. 695, 51 S. E. 2d 301
(1949); Southern Ry. v. Lissenbee, 219 N. C. 318, 13 S. E. 2d 561 (1941);
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Several cases in which the use has been held proper have indicated
that the manner in which the right of way may be used is within the
sole discretion of the railroad,8 but a later decision makes it clear that
the use must be for railroad purposes only.9 It is generally recognized
that the railroad may license third persons to use the right of way in any
manner in which the railroad itself might use it.10 If the easement is
used primarily for railroad purposes, the fact that incidental benefits
flow to private parties does not constitute a misuse of the easement.
It is difficult to define a "railroad purpose" with any degree of
certainty, but in practically all instances a proper use will be for one
or several of the following purposes: (1) The operation and main-
tenance of the railroad. This includes passenger and freight depots,11
shanties for the railroad employees,' 2 telegraph lines,'3 and warning
signals.' 4  (2) Promotion of the enjoyment and convenience of the
passengers and employees. The maintenance of hotels,' 5 restaurants,',
and parks' 7 are proper if used primarily by passengers and employees.
(3) The erection of facilities for receiving, storing, and shipping
freight. This includes use for -a lumber yard,' s grain elevator,'2 or
warehouse 20 where shipment of material is directly from these points
rather than from the regular freight depots. The impracticality of re-
McCullock v. N. C. R.R., 146 N. C. 316, 59 S. E. 882 (1907) ; Raleigh and Augusta
R.R. v. Olive, 142 N. C. 257, 55 S. E. 263 (1906). N. C. GEN. STAT §1-44 (1943)
provides that a railroad cannot be barred from its right of way by the adverse
possession of another.
" Carolina & N. W. Ry. v. Piedmont Wagon & Mfg. Co., 229 N. C. 695, 51
S. E. 2d 301 (1949); Southern Ry. v. Lissenbee,'219 N. C. 318, 13 S. E. 2d 561
(1941); Hodges v. A. C. L. R1R., 196 N. C. 66, 144 S. E. 528 (1928) ; Coit v.
Owenby-Wofford Co., 166 N. C. 136, 81 S. E. 1067 (1914) ; Raleigh and Augusta
R.R. v. Olive, 142 N. C. 257, 55 S. E. 263 (1906).
Sparrow v. Dixie Leaf Tobacco Co., 232 N. C. 589, 61 S. E. 2d 700 (1950).
10 Grand Trunk R.R. v. Richardson, 91 U. S. 454 (1875) ; Mitchell v. Illinois
C. R.R., 384 Ill. 258, 51 N. E. 2d 271 (1943); Weir v. Standard Oil Co., 136
Miss. 205, 101 So. 290 (1924); Coit v. Owenby-Wofford Co., 166 N. C. 136, 81
S. E. 1067 (1914).
11Elyton Land Co. v. South & North Ala. R.R., 95 Ala. 631, 10 So. 270 (1891).
"Hodges v. A. C. L. Ry., 196 N. C. 66, 144 S. E. 528 (1928).
"Hodges v. Western Union Tel. Co., 133 N. C. 225, 45 S. E. 572 (1903).
The telegraph line was held to be a misuse of the easement because it was pri-
marily for commercial purposes, but the court stated that had the line been erected
primarily for use in operation of the railroad it would have been proper.1 Southern Ry. v. Lissenbee, 219 N. C. 318, 13 S. E. 2d 561 (1941).
", Abraham v. Oregon & C. R.R., 370 Ore. 495, 60 Pac. 899 (1900) (But not
proper if used primarily by the general public.).
Grudger v. Richmond and Danville R.R., 106 N. C. 481, 11 S. E. 515 (1889).
N. C. GEN. STAT. §60-37(12) (1943) provides that a railroad may operate hotels
and restaurants along its right of way for the convenience of the traveling public.
" Louisville Property Co. v. Commonwealth, 146 Ky. 827, 143 S. W. 412(1Grand Truck R.R. v. Richardson, 91 U. S. 454 (1875).
1" Illinois Central R.R. v. Wathen, 17 Ill. App. 582 (1857).
"0 Anderson v. Interstate Mfg. Co., 152 Iowa 455, 132 N. W. 812 (1911) ; Coit
v. Owenby-Wofford Co., 166 N. C. 136, 81 S. E. 1067 (1914).
1951]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
quiring railroads to receive and ship all freight from its regular terminals
is apparent, and such a use seems justified. The use of these facilities,
however, should be of a substantial nature. A use of the easement
where gasoline was received for sales by a filling station was a mis-
use,21 whereas a use for bulk oil storage for distribution to retail dealers
was help proper.22  (4) Lease of the right of way to private parties to
secure their freight business. Several courts have stated that such a
use is for a railroad purpose, particularly where the lease provides that
the lessee give preference in shipment of freight to the railroads.
2 3  It
should be noted, however, that in practically all cases where a lease of
the right of way to procure business has been held proper, facilities for
receiving and shipping freight have existed upon the leased property and
have been a prime factor in determining the propriety of the use.
In a recent case, the defendant tobacco company leased from a rail-
road for a nominal rent a portion of its right of way upon which the
tobacco company erected two warehouses. The lease contained no pro-
vision compelling the tobacco company to ship over the railroad, but
the company did so in all but a few instances. A spur track had orig-
inally been extended to the warehouses to facilitate shipment, but it was
removed prior to this action. The tobacco company thereafter shipped
all its freight from the regular freight depot. The owner of the fee,
subject to the railroad right of way, was allowed to recover the land
upon which the warehouses were located in an action of ejectment on
the ground that the leased property was not being used for railroad
purposes.24
Due to the absence of any shipping facilities on the right of way,
the decision appears to be in accordance with authority. The court
emphasized the lack of an express provision to ship over the railroad,
but under the circumstances, such a provision appears unnecessary.2
That the rent was nominal and that the tobacco company shipped almost
21 hn re Chicago & N. W. R.R., 127 F. 2d 1001 (7th Cir. 1942).
22 Mitchell v. Illinois C. R.R., 384 Ill. 258, 51 N. E. 2d 271 (1943); Weir v.
Standard Oil Co., 136 Miss. 205, 101 So. 290 (1924).
"Anderson v. Interstate Mfg. Co., 152 Iowa 455, 132 N. W. 812 (1911)
(shipping a part of its goods over a competitor railroad not sufficient to work a
forfetiture) ; Griswold v. Ill. C. R.R., 90 Iowa 265, 57 N. W. 843 (1894) ; City
of Detroit v. C. H. Little Co., 146 Mich. 384, 109 N. W. 671 (1906) ; Hall v.
Bowers, 117 Neb. 619, 222 N. W. 40 (1928) (use of right of way to drive cattle
to shipping terminal); Coit v. Owenby-Wofford Co., 166 N. C. 136, 81 S. E. 1067
(1914).
2S Sparrow v. Dixie Leaf Tobacco Co., 232 N. C. 589, 61 S. E. 2d 700 (1950).
2 The lack of a provision to give the railroad preference in shipment was the
principal distinction made between the present case and a previous case in which
the use of a right of way for a wholesale grocery warehouse was held proper.
However, the decision there rested primarily on the fact that the use of the land
was to facilitate shipment over the railroad. Coit v. Owenby-Wofford Co., 166
N. C. 136, 81 S. E. 1067 (1914), 28 HARv. L. Rrv. 208 (1914).
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exclusively over the lessor railroad dearly indicate that the procure-
ment of business was the real consideration for the execution of the
lease. In the absence of shipping facilities, it is questionable if a lease
of a portion of the right of way solely to promote business would be
held proper, even where there is a provision to give the railroad pref-
erence in shipping.26
Where there is a misuse of the easement, several remedies are avail-
able to the owner of the fee. If the railroad abandons operation of the
road altogether, it has forfeited all rights to the easement, and the owner
may reenter the land.2 7  But when the railroad continues in operation,
and only a portion of the right of way has been subjected to a misuse,
the owner of the fee may obtain an injunction to prevent further mis-
use,28 or bring an action for damages against the party so misusing the
land,29 or, as in the principal case, bring ejectment for recovery of that
portion of the easement so misused.30 Where the additional burden
placed upon the land is itself for a public purpose, damages are as a
general rule the only remedy available.2 ' If permanent damages are
recovered, the effect is to give an easement to the party paying the
damages.3 2  It should be noted that an action for damages in such cases
20 "The fact that a business receives its goods by rail is not a conclusive de-
termination that the use of easement land by the business is a proper one and not
a burden." Io re Chicago & N. W. R.R., 127 F. 2d 1001 (7th Cir. 1942) ; Bond
v. Tex. & P. R.R., 181 La. 763, 160 So. 406 (1935) ; Proprietors of the Locks and
Canals v. Nashua & L. R.R., 104 Mass. 1 (1870).
-7 Norton v. Duluth Transfer R.R., 129 Minn. 126, 151 N. W. 907 (1915).
4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §1256 (3d ed. 1939). But where buildings and other
improvements are placed upon the right of way for the operation of the railroad,
they may be removed in the same manner as personal property. Western N. C.
R.R. v. Deal, 90 N. C. 110 (1884).
2" Hodges v. A. C. L. Ry., 196 N. C. 66, 144 S. S. 528 (1928). Note, 7
N. C. L. Rav. 197 (1929) (Injunction was refused, but the court states that
injunction was the proper remedy had there been a misuse of the right of way.) ;
Hales v. A. C. L. Ry., 172 N. C. 104, 90 S. E. 11 (1916) ; Ragsdale v. Southern
Ry. Co., 60 S. C. 381, 38 S. E. 609 (1901).
28 McCullock v. N. C. R.R., 146 N. C. 316, 59 S. E. 882 (1907); Beasley v.
Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R., 145 N. C. 272, 59 S. E. 60 (1907) ; Hodges v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 133 N. C. 225, 45 S. E. 572 (1903).
20 Mitchell v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 384 I1. 258, 51 N. E. 2d 271 (1943) ; Neitzel
v. Spokane International R.R., 65 Wash. 100, 117 Pac. 864 (1911).
" In McCullock v. N. C. R.R., 146 N. C. 316, 59 S. E. 882 (1907) the railroad
leased its right of way to a larger line, which used it to a much greater extent.
The holder of the fee sought ejectment because of the additional burden, but was
awarded damages, the measure being the difference in the extent which the lessor
road would have used the land and the extent which the larger railroad did use
the land. Hodges v. Western Union Tel. Co., 133 N. C. 225, 45 S. E. 572 (1903).
But several cases have held that even where the misuse was not for other public
purposes, there could be no ejectment. Proprietors of the Locks and Canals v.
Nashua & L. R.R., 104 Mass. 1 (1870) (mesne profits recovered); Lyon v.
McDonald, 78 Tex. 71, 14 S. W. 261 (1890) (reasonable rental value recovered).
" McCullock v. N. C. R.R., 146 N. C. 316, 59 S. E. 882 (1907) ; Phillips v.
Postal Telegraph Cable Co., 130 N. C. 513, 41 S. E. 1022 (1902).
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is subject to the three-year statute of limitations,3 3 whereas ejectment
is apparently available for at least twenty years from the date of entry.
3 4
Although the remedies available to the owner of the fee in case of a
misuse of a right of way may appear to be in the nature of a windfall,
the inherent right of a landowner to have land which is taken for the
public use restricted to that use seems to justify his right to relief.
S. DEAN HAMRICK.
Restraint of Trade-Requirements Contracts-Violation
of North Carolina Anti-Trust Statute
A North Carolina anti-trust statute' makes it unlawful for any per-
son to make a sale, or to contract to make a sale "of any goods . . . in
North Carolina, whether directly or indirectly . . . upon the condition
that the purchaser thereof shall not deal in the goods . . . of a com-
petitor or rival in the business of the person ... making such sales."
In Grubb Oil Co. v. Garner,2 the court held that a filling station
lessor's covenant not to sell any petroleum products other than those
of the lessee from the demised premises or from any other premises
within a radius of two thousand feet constituted a "permissible restric-
tion in a lease rather than a forbidden condition in a sales contract."8
The court said the lessor apparently had no right to sell or deal with
anything on the premises while under demise but, however this might
be,4 there was no allegation that the lessor agreed to purchase petroleum
products from anyone---"a necessary averment to attract the provisions
*IN. C. GEN. STAT. §1-52(3) (1943) provides that when there is a continuing
trespass upon real property, the action shall be commenced within three years from
the original trespass, and not thereafter. Teeter v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co.,
172 N. C. 783, 90 S. E. 941 (1916).
" Sparrow v. Dixie Leaf Tobacco Co., 232 N. C. 589, 61 S. E. 2d 700 (1950).
2 N. C. GEr. STAT. §75-5 (1943): "In addition to the matters and things
hereinbefore declared to be illegal, the following acts are declared to be unlaw-
ful, that is, for any person, firm, corporation, or association directly or indirectly
to do or to have any contract, express or knowingly implied, to do any of the acts
or things specified in any of the subsections of this section. (2) To make a sale
.of any goods, wares, merchandise, articles or things of value whatsoever in North
Carolina, whether directly or indirectly, or through any agent or employee, upon
the condition that the purchaser thereof shall not deal in the goods, wares, merchan-
dise, articles or things of value of a competitor or rival in the business of the
person, firm, corporation or association making such sales." For the original
enactment of the North Carolina statute to this effect see N. C. Pub. Laws 1907,
c. 218, §1 (a).
2230 N. C. 499, 53 S. E. 2d 441 (1949).
3 Id. at 501, 53 S. E. 2d at 443.
'Because of confusion in pleading it did not clearly appear by what arrange-
ment the lessor was in possession of the premises. Although a lease-sublease
arrangement was referred to, it was not properly alleged and therefore not con-
sidered by the court. Id. at 501, 53 S. E. 2d at 442.
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